By Rob Doherty

David Hunter retired in Spring 2025 after a long and distinguished career as a professor of international and comparative environmental law at American University’s Washington College of Law. Before joining the law faculty full-time in 2003, he worked for the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) for a decade, serving as its executive director from 1999–2001. Now professor emeritus at AU, David was one of the driving forces in the creation of the World Bank Inspection Panel in 1993. The Panel’s establishment set an important precedent in international law, as the World Bank became the first international organization to enable individuals to complain about the organization’s impacts on their lives without going through their governments. Today there are 23 members of the Independent Accountability Mechanisms (IAMs) Network. David recently responded to questions from Accountability Matters.

Did your involvement with environmental and social accountability at international financial institutions (IFIs) start with efforts to create the Inspection Panel, or were you involved prior to that?

My interest in environmental and social accountability at IFIs began in early 1991 when I helped CIEL in its efforts to integrate environmental and social issues into the operations of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). I was working in what was then Czechoslovakia to strengthen its environmental laws and build the capacity of public interest environmental lawyers. My experience there confirmed to me that meaningful public participation, particularly of affected communities, was critical for protecting the environment. The environmental devastation that plagued many post-Soviet countries was not due to a failure to have technical environmental standards, but due to a failure of institutional accountability, compliance, and implementation at the project level. This was consistent with the U.S. experience as well, where the emphasis on public participation and the use of citizen lawsuits were among the most important driving forces for environmental protection. I believed the centrality of community engagement to environmental protection was as true at the international level as it was at the national level. CIEL was a natural fit for me because it had been established just a few years earlier explicitly to expand opportunities for the public to participate directly in international environmental law.

By the time I joined CIEL, it was already part of the vibrant IFI reform campaign coordinated very effectively by Chad Dobson of the Bank Information Center. The IFI reform campaign had already developed a political strategy that centered on raising the voices of affected people at the World Bank and in the capitals of its member countries. Lori Udall of the Environmental Defense Fund asked me to co-author a draft “resolution” outlining a people-centered Independent Appeals Commission at the World Bank. We based our proposal on a similar proposal developed by CIEL’s Durwood Zaelke and Chris Wold for an independent inspection tribunal at the EBRD. The proposal, which was attached to Lori’s testimony before the U.S. Congress, essentially became the outline of the U.S. position for a three-member, people-centered compliance mechanism and, ultimately, for the Panel itself. For me, it was a classic case of being in the right place at the right time—two hours of work led to an entire career of designing, using, and defending accountability mechanisms.

You were actively engaged in efforts in the early 1990s to create the Inspection Panel as the first IAM at an IFI. What do you remember most about those days?

I have many memories from the early days of operationalizing the Panel—particularly of moving it from a paper resolution at the Board to an actually independent, responsive institution.  Nothing like the Panel had ever been created before; it was the first international institution to create a mechanism by which locally affected people could have direct access to top decision makers. This was a significant innovation in international law and received a tremendous amount of academic attention. But it was (and remains) quite controversial among Bank management and some member countries.

I mostly remember persistent efforts to resist what I (and others in the CSO community) perceived as efforts by the Bank to constrain the Panel’s independence—beginning with the selection of the first Panel chairperson (Ernst-Günther Bröder) and the executive secretary (Eduardo Abbott). We had little input into their selection and their backgrounds did not suggest they were particularly concerned about affected communities. I am happy to say that we were wrong on both accounts. Ernst and Eduardo proved to be fierce defenders of the Panel and its mandate to investigate the concerns of local communities.

I also remember our interactions with Ibrahim Shihata, the Bank’s General Counsel and the author of the Panel resolution. Minutes of the Board debates over the creation of the Panel show how Shihata’s draft resolution was critical to the final outcome.  He gave the United States and other Panel supporters a mechanism that was accessible by locally affected people—the fundamental and most controversial innovation of the Panel—but he also burdened the Panel process with legalistic eligibility criteria and limited authorities, intended to limit the Panel’s ultimate effectiveness as a way to reassure its opponents. We had several contested meetings in the early days over the appropriate role of the General Counsel vis-à-vis the Panel—a role that is inherently conflicted. Reflective of the new relevance of affected communities, these were the first meetings in which the Bank General Counsel had ever felt compelled to meet with the civil society representatives of affected communities.

But maybe most memorable were the early cases of the Panel, particularly the Arun dam in Nepal, the Rondonia natural resource management project in Brazil, the Yacyreta dam in Argentina and Paraguay. Bringing these cases took a leap of faith by our colleagues in the project areas, and each was opposed in some way by Bank management. The process became more legalistic, and we had to engage in continued debates at the Board that would lead to two clarifications (1996 Review, 1999 Clarification) in the first five years of Panel operations. Many in the Bank hierarchy have yet to accept the Panel’s mission of bringing community concerns to the forefront of the development debate at the Board. But the Panel has survived and continues to be a vital conduit for affected communities to engage the Bank.

The Panel was created in 1993. Today, the Independent Accountability Mechanism Network (IAMNet) has 23 members. Are you satisfied with the work being done by IAMs at international financial institutions?

The wide acceptance and adoption of the norm of international public accountability has been one of the most surprising developments among IAMs. I never imagined that all the multilateral development banks, many bilateral agencies, UN agencies, and even some CSOs would agree to establish citizen-driven accountability mechanisms. This in itself is a remarkable achievement and speaks loudly to the type of work and impact of the Panel (and the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, CAO).

The presence of IAMs, however, does not by itself enhance the accountability of the development institutions to local communities. Many of the IAMs are not supported by their institutions as critical to the underlying development mandates. They are under-resourced, under-staffed, and often lack sufficient authority to influence the activities of the institutions and improve the outcomes on the ground. This is typically not the fault of the IAM staff, but results from an institutional lack of commitment to reducing the environmental & social (E&S) risk visited on local communities.

Most IFIs have yet to embrace the importance of listening to and addressing community concerns in the way that they operate. IFIs remain top-down decision makers that prioritize macroeconomic and financial information that often masks the development costs of projects. The idea of “sacrificing for the greater good” not only justifies decisions that disproportionately impact local communities, but it sometimes justifies not even considering those impacts fully. Many of the banks’ recent priorities—whether it is to consolidate and make the environmental and social policies more flexible or move investments more quickly into higher-risk countries or sectors—create greater environmental and social risks. The IFIs, the countries, and the borrowers all have ways to allocate or reduce their own E&S risks from the project. But the local communities do not have ways to reduce or manage their risks, and they are the ones who bear the brunt of those decisions to take more risks.

By giving voice to the risks faced by affected communities, the IAMs represent a fundamentally different approach to development to that reflected in the ways the IFIs operate. Institutions that systematically marginalize the concerns of local communities in their own decision making are not likely to support the IAMs. Many IAMs operate in this context—where local impacts are not considered central to the development mission. The IAMs thus must constantly justify their value to the institution and must defend themselves from constant attacks on their independence and effectiveness. 

If you could recommend one thing to improve E&S accountability at the IFIs, what would that be?

There are several things I would do to improve E&S accountability. First, the highest levels of the banks need to affirm the centrality of reducing and addressing the E&S risks facing local communities to achieve the institution’s development goals. As part of this, the institutions need to consistently embrace the IAMs and their community-facing orientation as integral to meeting the banks’ missions.

Second and relatedly, the reward system within the financial institutions needs to be overhauled to reward those project staff who take E&S concerns seriously whether they are raised by local communities, E&S staff, and/or the IAMs. Ever since the Wapenhans Report came out in the early 1990s, we have all understood that the pressure on bank staff is overwhelmingly to approve projects and move money. The quality and development impact of projects, particularly over the long term, are almost never reflected in the reward system for project staff. As a result, raising E&S concerns that can slow down or even reject a project is never seen as a career-enhancing move. The reward system needs to do just the opposite, rewarding bank staff who listen to E&S concerns and who fully support and cooperate with E&S staff and the IAM staff when they raise such concerns.

Third, the institutions spend way too much time scrutinizing the IAMs—often motivated by how the IAMs can be made more “cost-efficient” or their operations aligned more with the institution’s project cycle. This scrutiny of IAMs only rarely focuses on how to enhance the experience of the locally affected people who seek help from IAMs. The focus on IAMs also deflects the institutions from looking at the broader E&S accountability system as a whole. IAMs are just one aspect of a well-functioning accountability system. We need to pay more attention to other aspects of E&S accountability, including questions of whether E&S staff are adequately empowered within the bank operations, whether bank staff are learning and applying the findings from IAM cases, and how we improve the capacity of borrowers to address E&S concerns generally and not just in Bank-supported projects.

Finally, and this is a pet peeve of mine, I’d like to see the IFIs, particularly the International Finance Corporation (IFC), change who they view as their “client” in the development process. IFC refers exclusively to their private-sector borrowers as their clients; they never speak about locally affected people as their clients. This reflects IFC’s general approach to benchmark their operations with the private-sector financial institutions so that they can compete for business with the likes of Citibank. This denies what should make them different (and better) than Citibank—IFC’s success should be defined by their development impact in bettering the lives of affected people, and not on the returns to their investors. A good place to start would be for IFC to recognize explicitly that their ultimate clients include the people affected (both those who are beneficiaries and those who are harmed) by their projects.

You have been involved with American University’s Washington College of Law (AUWCL) for nearly 35 years. What are you most proud of from your time there?

Thank you for this question. AUWCL is a remarkable institution because of its commitment to the promotion of international law and to the right of all people throughout the world to live a life with dignity under the fair due process of law. It is no accident that two of the main external advocates of IAMs—Professor Danny Bradlow and I—were part of AUWCL or that the first Accountability Research Center (founded by Jonathan Fox) is at AU’s School of International Service.  Our work on these issues was particularly valued and supported by our AU colleagues and the institution.

The school also attracts amazing students from around the world, who have gone on to make a huge impact not only on E&S accountability at the IFIs, but also on the development of environmental law in the U.S. and many other parts of the world. I always joke with my students that I will take credit for everything they do once they graduate. Although I don’t actually take credit for what they accomplish, I do take tremendous pride in what they do, and I am forever grateful to have had the opportunity to have learned from them over the years. I only hope I impacted them as much as they impacted me.

You retired from AU in the spring and now hold the title of professor emeritus. How are you spending your time these days and do you intend to stay involved in issues of international environmental law? 

I have retired from teaching and from most of my obligations at the school, but I still plan to remain active on issues of accountability and on international environmental law, more generally.   I am currently in the middle of a project (along with Danny Bradlow, Nick Paul, and Vishna Ramaswamy) that is documenting the establishment of the IAMs and exploring their impact. We have solicited many perspectives on the Inspection Panel and other IAMs, published a comprehensive bibliography on the IAMs, and created an archive of historical documents relating to the IAMs.  Although still a “work in progress,” the project can be found at https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/accountability-perspectives/. An open access book comprised of the Perspectives essays will be published soon by Brill Publishing. We are also planning a separate book focused on the development, establishment, and impact of the CAO. The CAO is a remarkable institution that has received much less academic attention than the Inspection Panel, despite having a huge impact on the development of IAMs and on E&S accountability in the private sector. I will continue to do some writing on international environmental law, including potentially the sixth edition of International Environmental Law and Policy—a textbook that has had a significant impact on the development of international environmental law. I still serve on the Boards of Directors of Accountability Counsel and CIEL, and I expect to continue to engage on current issues of E&S accountability, although with less consistency and visibility than in the past.

You were diagnosed several years ago with Parkinson’s disease. How are you tackling that challenge?

Thank you for this question. I was diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease 12 years ago. In general, I have tried to contain the disease and its impacts to as small a part of my daily life as possible.

It is impossible to ignore the disease, but I don’t proactively engage with it. I don’t study it. I trust my doctors to keep up on medical advancements, and I try not to spend too much time talking about it. This was pretty easy for the first 10 years of the disease as the impacts were relatively minor. To the extent that the symptoms were visible to others, it just seemed that I was growing older faster than my peers. I’m not sure that means I’m growing wiser but I’m certainly growing older. And growing older, as many people know, is all about making accommodations and not self-limiting your activities.

Having said that, I have always loved the work that I do—particularly representing affected communities, interacting with students, and engaging with the IAMs. And I had no intention of retiring but Parkinson’s made me less effective and the work less enjoyable because I cannot predict how my body and mind respond on any given day.

But in many ways having Parkinson’s has been a blessing. I am prioritizing activities I can do now but maybe not in a year or two—for example, I have taken far more time to fly-fish and bird watch—two hobbies that have enriched my life since I was six years old. More importantly, I am forced to seek and accept help from virtually everyone I meet, including perfect strangers who help me navigate airports in a wheelchair, professional colleagues who tolerate my taking a nap in the middle of a conference or workshop, and of course my friends and family who support me daily. I have learned to accept the gratitude of students, colleagues, and others who make more of an effort to thank me because of the disease, and I have learned to express my gratitude for the impact others have had on my life and career. And, in that regard, let me use this interview to thank all the people at the IFIs, the IAMs, the CSOs, and in the affected communities with whom I have had the privilege to work on accountability over the past 30-plus years and who have made this work so impactful.