By Jennine Meyer 

Few people are as well-positioned as Maninder Gill to comment on the past and present of accountability at the World Bank. He began his distinguished career at the Bank soon after the creation of the Inspection Panel in 1993 and has had a front row seat to its evolution ever since. In this Q and A, he reflects on the connection between accountability and development, the role of Management in compliance processes, and the importance of meaningful engagement with civil society, among other topics. We are pleased to present his perspectives in Accountability Matters.

How do you define “accountability” in the World Bank context, and why does it matter for development outcomes?

At the World Bank, accountability means ensuring that the people who may be affected and those who benefit from the projects we support—especially the most vulnerable—have a voice, access to information, and avenues to meaningfully engage in development projects and express concerns when they believe things have not gone as planned. Accountability is not just an institutional priority that we work closely with our Borrowers to implement; it is a cornerstone of development effectiveness.

When communities can engage meaningfully and safely raise concerns with confidence they will be addressed appropriately, project design and implementation improve, trust deepens, risks are identified earlier and more adequately, and mitigation is more effective. Our accountability structure—ranging from Borrowers’ project‑level grievance mechanisms, the Bank’s Grievance Redress Service, to independent bodies like the Bank’s Accountability Mechanism—helps ensure that development delivers results in a manner that protects people and the environment along the way.

Under Environmental and Social Framework (ESF) provisions on grievance redress and accountability, projects supported by the World Bank (IBRD/IDA) include a number of mechanisms for addressing concerns and grievances that may arise in connection with project activities. Project-affected parties have access, as appropriate, to project-level grievance mechanisms, local grievance mechanisms, the World Bank’s corporate Grievance Redress Service (http://www.worldbank.org/GRS; e-mail: grievances@worldbank.org) and the World Bank Accountability Mechanism, including the Inspection Panel and the Dispute Resolution Service.

You joined the World Bank shortly after the Inspection Panel was created in 1993. How have you seen accountability evolve since then?

Prior to joining the World Bank, I worked on the Sardar Sarovar Dam project on India’s Narmada River, which required the resettlement of thousands of affected people and communities. The environmental mitigation and the resettlement process in this project and the serious concerns and grassroots resistance it generated led to a debate about the absence of a permanent accountability mechanism at the World Bank, which eventually became one of the drivers for the Bank’s Board to create the Inspection Panel in 1993.

When the Inspection Panel was established, it was a groundbreaking move—it gave communities affected by World Bank‑financed projects a channel to elevate their concerns directly with the World Bank’s Board. As the first-ever independent accountability mechanism among international finance institutions (IFIs), the creation of the Inspection Panel marked a watershed moment in the history of development finance, establishing a model that other IFIs would later emulate, and making the World Bank a leader in accountability.

In the early years, however, accountability was largely reactive. Mechanisms were triggered when harm had already occurred. Over time, we’ve shifted from a reactive posture to one that is much more proactive and preventive. The adoption of the ESF was a major milestone. It embedded accountability into project design through clearer and more integrated environmental and social (E&S) standards, better and more proportionate risk assessment and management tools, and a stronger emphasis on meaningful stakeholder engagement and grievance redress that is ongoing throughout the lifecycle of a project. Today, accountability is understood not only as supporting compliance, but as good development practice—a continuous learning process that helps us improve outcomes across the portfolio.

We have also just introduced a new integrated E&S structure of Makers and Checkers across the World Bank Group (including IFC and MIGA) with the objective of establishing a more robust system for proactive risk management. The objective is to ensure that attention to E&S matters remains constant during the project life cycle, to facilitate escalation of issues for rapid response, and to improve technical oversight through a set of people with a singular focus on flagging E&S risks and monitoring that they are adequately addressed. This integrated system of Makers and Checkers will also support sharing of good practices and lessons learned across the institutions. Ultimately, the new set-up will further strengthen accountability in Bank-financed projects.

What role does Management play in compliance processes? And what lessons have emerged from Management’s engagement in these cases?

Management plays a key role in ensuring that concerns raised by communities are addressed promptly, transparently, and constructively. Through its fact-finding function, the Inspection Panel helps the Board identify potential non-compliance in a project which led to harm. Bank Management has the relationship with Member Countries to help address relevant findings with any corrective actions that may be required. This includes reviewing project-level issues, coordinating corrective actions, and promoting close collaboration between task teams and project counterparts from Member Countries to strengthen systems on the ground.

When underlying issues are found to have broader relevance beyond a specific project, Management strives to review and share these insights across the institution through various channels (e.g., trainings, briefings, regional portfolio reviews). Additionally, it can issue specific guidance or instructions and make necessary workflow or resource adjustments. In some cases, feedback and analysis of specific compliance issues have prompted clarifications of policy requirements or issuance of new guidance when a lack of clarity or gaps were identified as contributing factors to the issue of concern.

For example, the Uganda: Transport Sector Development Project involved serious adverse impacts on a remote community, including cases of child sexual abuse and teenage pregnancies caused by road workers hired by the project contractor. The Project was approved in 2009 for a US$ 75 million IDA credit with the objective of helping to improve the connectivity and efficiency of the transport sector, which included upgrading the national road network and enhancing capacity for road safety management. Following this case, and informed by additional internal reviews, the World Bank issued new staff guidance to manage risk related to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and Sexual Harassment (SEA-SH) in investment project financing, and a Technical Note on Grievance Mechanisms for SEA-SH. Management also constituted a Gender-Based Violence (GBV) task force to develop specific recommendations. It also hired GBV/SEA-SH specialists and introduced SEA-SH risk rating as a separate risk category. Moreover, through the Multilateral Financial Institutions (MFI) working group, the World Bank shared these experiences with other multilateral development banks. Management also took broader actions aimed at strengthening environmental and social provisions for procurement in World Bank-supported operations (i.e., tendering, bidding, and contract awarding). The recruitment, management, and supervision of the workforce required for a project is the contractor’s responsibility, yet it must comply with the World Bank’s E&S policy requirements.

Civil society organizations often argue that the World Bank should do more to ensure communities know about the availability of accountability mechanisms. How do you respond?

This is an important point, and one the institution takes seriously.

While the institution has made significant progress in this area—especially under the ESF, which strengthened requirements for stakeholder engagement and grievance mechanisms—we recognize that more can be done because what really matters is that grievance mechanisms at every level are accessible, trusted, and responsive.

Over the past several years, we have seen a large increase in the number of complaints submitted to the World Bank through the corporate Grievance Redress Service (GRS). In FY25 alone, the GRS received a record number of 1,139 complaints, up from 723 in FY24. While some interpret this rise as negative, I interpret this as evidence of a well-functioning and available system. The year-on-year growth in the volume of admissible and inadmissible complaints received by the GRS is a good sign that indicates that project-affected people are increasingly aware of the GRS and find it to be useful for raising and resolving concerns. The GRS complements both the project-level grievance mechanisms managed by Borrowers, and the World Bank’s independent Accountability Mechanism (i.e., Inspection Panel and Dispute Resolution Service).

While we clearly see progress in the volume of complaints submitted directly to the institution, we are also committed to engaging with civil society organizations as invaluable partners in this effort, and we welcome their feedback as we continue to work on improving our outreach and communication to project-affected communities.

Finally, it is important to note that independent accountability mechanisms provide an important avenue for communities to raise concerns, but they are not the only option. One of the most significant changes since 1994 is that many Member Countries have substantially strengthened their environmental and social legislation, creating specialized judicial and administrative bodies—such as the Green Tribunal in India or the Ouvidorias (Ombudsman) offices in Brazil. In fact, the ESF’s stakeholder engagement standard (ESS10) clarifies that in-country judicial and administrative avenues remain available to seek redress.

What are the most common accountability gaps you see during preparation and implementation, and how do teams typically address them?

Some of the key challenges we often face in project preparation and implementation are (i) weak or ineffective grievance mechanisms (GMs); and (ii) limited Borrower capacity.

On the first point, while GMs may be adequately described in project documentation, some of them lack adequate staffing or the clarity needed to make them function well to address project-related concerns. Many implementation challenges stem from GMs that are not fully operational, lacking sufficient funds, are insufficiently communicated, or unable to resolve complaints in a timely, transparent way. This limits opportunities for adaptive management and the incorporation of lessons learned to improve project design and implementation.

To address this, we emphasize clearer Borrower commitments in Environmental and Social Commitment Plans (ESCPs), and increased implementation support by Bank teams in reviewing the functionality of project-level GMs from an operational perspective, beyond review of project documents such as Stakeholder Engagement Plans (SEPs). The Bank has thus produced practical tools, GM checklists, technical notes, and hands-on support to help teams and clients set up accessible and inclusive GMs. In addition, teams regularly report on GM functionality as part of implementation support and results (ISR) reports.

The ESF places a greater focus on strengthening Borrower capacity. As part of recent efforts to strengthen and streamline ESF implementation, we have placed a renewed focus on this by conducting country-level Overview Assessments of Borrowers’ existing policy, legal, and institutional systems for addressing E&S risks and impacts, and identifying measures to help strengthen them. We have also promoted a greater use of Borrowers’ own E&S frameworks to help strengthen them, and this includes strengthening existing stakeholder engagement practices and GMs. One of the key objectives of the recent work on strengthening and streamlining ESF implementation is making sure we place sufficient emphasis not just on upstream documentation, but also on project implementation and ensuring we operationalize our commitments on the ground.

Based on your experiences, what lessons would you highlight from accountability cases over the years?

Some issues—such as sexual exploitation and abuse discussed earlier, or impacts on Indigenous Peoples—require specialized expertise as well as careful and targeted approaches, including a survivor-centered approach when addressing SEA-SH. The institution has stepped up staffing to support clients and issued guidance materials and good practice notes reflecting years of learning from such cases.

I have also discussed the importance of GMs to be both well-designed and their presence well-disseminated. Only if the existence of a mechanism is well known by project communities and only if it is trusted will it be considered an effective mechanism. In addition, the institution is increasingly operating in insecure environments with projects in situations of fragility, conflict, or violence (FCV). A case related to the Democratic Republic of Congo ProRoutes Project, which was reviewed by the Panel, involved instances of physical violence against community members by the contractor’s security firm, among other findings. It also highlighted the constraints for the institution, government, and contractors to work in highly fragile and insecure environments, where for security reasons normal project supervision may not be possible over an extended period. It is certainly more challenging to carry out supervision in insecure environments where it is difficult for our staff or even the government’s project staff to be on the ground. Based on this case and the review of other FCV operations, the institution issued staff guidance to manage risk related to security firms and FCV.

You recently became the Global WBG Director for Policy and Operations, or “Chief Maker”. How would you describe the evolution of the Bank’s environmental and social standards, and what does the future look like?

The evolution of our standards reflects a step forward toward the institution’s vision for sustainable development. Earlier safeguard policies were designed primarily to prevent harm. Over time, as development challenges grew more complex—climate change, biodiversity loss, labor and supply chain risks—our approach needed to become more comprehensive, integrated, adaptive, and forward-looking.

The ESF represents that shift. It focuses on strengthening Borrowers’ own E&S Frameworks, taking a more risk-based and proportionate approach to risk management and project design and implementation, and ensuring that E&S considerations form an integral part of helping projects achieve better and lasting development outcomes.

Looking ahead, our focus will be to further strengthen our risk management systems; flag and tackle issues early; and work more closely as one WBG to share knowledge, expertise, and lessons learned. I also see opportunities to further integrate E&S considerations and procurement, deepen partnerships with countries to strengthen their own E&S systems, and strengthen use of digital and AI tools to support E&S risks management. Above all, the future of E&S standards will be about enhancing implementation and development outcomes—ensuring that they translate into tangible development outcomes for people and the planet, in Bank-supported projects and beyond.